🔗 Share this article

In October 2022, as Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he was the fifth British prime minister to occupy the position in six years.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this signified unprecedented political turmoil. So what term captures what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its fifth premier in two years – three of them in the past 10 months?

The latest prime minister, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on Tuesday, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his administration's continuation.

But it is, in the best case, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is locked in a political permacrisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for decades – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.

Governing Without a Majority

Key background: from the moment Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a hung parliament split into three opposing factions – the left, the far right and his own centre-right alliance – none with anything close to a majority.

Simultaneously, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now nearly double the EU limit, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are approaching.

In this challenging environment, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the leader named his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which proved to be largely unchanged from before – he faced fury from allies and opponents alike.

To such an extent that the next day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a respectful address, he blamed political intransigence, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job virtually unworkable.

A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a last-ditch effort to salvage cross-party backing – a task, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The president’s office confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the nation's opposing groups were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a high-stakes speech, the 39-year-old PM spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already supportive, the Socialists said they would not back no-confidence motions proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS clearly stated that it would be demanding further compromises. “This move,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, similar to the Socialists, the right-leaning parties are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To succeed, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, similar to his forerunners, finished.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Even if, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to pass a budget by year-end, the prospects for the government beyond that look bleak.

So is there a way out? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.

An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his replacement would disband the assembly and aim for a legislative majority in the following election. But this also remains unclear.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that France’s voters, having elected a far-right president, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a thing of the past, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that cultural shift will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”